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Which Chance was Lost?
The Psychology of Damage Awards
under the Loss of Chance Doctrine
J O N A T H A N J. K O E H L E R

1. INTRODUCTION
Behavioral decision theorists commonly think about their discipline in the
binary terms given by normative and descriptive theory. Whereas normative
theory is concerned with how people should behave (as given by models such as
subjective expected utility or Bayes theorem), descriptive theory is concerned
with how people actually do behave. Thanks in large part to the pioneering work
of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, behavioral research has shown that
people frequently and systematically violate normative theory. For example,
people violate various axioms of subjective expected utility theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1986) and make probability judgments that deviate from Bayesian norms (Wells and Harvey 1978). Although
some deviations from normative theory are properly treated as errors, others may
help us re¯ect on the completeness of normative theory as a guide for real world
decision-making.
For example, it is well known that lay people do not evaluate risks according
to the criteria that experts recommend. Whereas experts are guided by probability, outcome, and expected value computations, the general public pays close
attention to a risk's controllability, catastrophic potential, and the feelings of
dread that it inspires (Slovic 1987, 1997; Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990). Is the
public's approach in error? The answer depends on the breadth of the perspective
one adopts. If one wishes to minimize expected harm, then perhaps these psychological in¯uences should be resisted. However, if one's goal is more complex
(e.g. to feel safe, to eliminate certain types of future risks), then it may be
reasonable to consider various psychological factors.
Portions of this chapter were presented at the 2nd Conference on Psychology and Economics, Centre
for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) & European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and
Statistics (ECARES), Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 2001.
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1.1. The Law
Until recently, the law had little use for psychological research that suggested
that people behave in ways other than that prescribed by standard normative
theories. The dominant paradigm for understanding legal rules and behaviors
was homo economicus (see, for example, Posner 1998). Under this view, behavioral studies of legal decision-making were unnecessary because, in the high
stakes arena of the courtroom, standard economic models were presumed to
provide adequate descriptive accounts.
Recently, though, an interdisciplinary movement called ``law and behavioral
science'' (Korobkin and Ulen 2000) or ``behavioral law and economics'' (Sunstein
2000) has emerged that provides an important reality check on the economic
paradigm. Scholarly studies that this movement has encouraged are beginning to
provide a richer and more realistic analysis of legal rules and judgments
(Farber 2001).
Consider, for example, the world of tort law where fact®nders determine
the size of damage awards that negligent defendants must pay injured
plaintiffs. Recent research with mock jurors suggests that the amount of outrage
(Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein 1998; Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade
1998) and anger (Koehler and Gershoff, in press: experiment 3) fact®nders feel
affect the size of the awards they give. Although some have argued that such
emotional responses ``interfere'' with legal decision-making (Posner 1999: 321),
others have suggested that ``the law should be structured to encourage
those emotions that promote socially desired outcomes'' (Kahan and Nussbaum
1996: 354).
Regardless of one's position on the normative status of emotions in legal
decision-making, it is important to learn more about the psychology that affects
fact®nders' reactions. Of special interest here are factors that affect jurors'
judgments in medical malpractice cases. Speci®cally, this chapter examines
damage awards mock jurors provide to patients (as represented by surviving
family members) who were deprived of a chance to live due to a doctor's
negligence.
The policies that govern malpractice award valuations vary widely across
states and jurisdictions. Sometimes jurors' judgment plays a large role and
sometimes it plays a small role or no role at all. In the coming pages, I suggest
that there is a psychology to these award valuations that has its roots in classic
research on the psychology of risky decision-making.
2. HOW TO COMPENSATE A LOST CHANCE TO LIVE
How much money should a person receive as compensation for a lost chance to
live? On the one side are those who would argue that life is priceless, and that
any attempt to assign dollar values to lives or probabilistic parts of lives
is misguided. On the other side are those who would argue that monetary
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compensation for a lost chance to live should be determined by an algebraic
formula based on such estimable variables as the amount of chance and future
income that was lost.
Though offensive to some (cf. Fiske and Tetlock 1997), the law is largely on
the side of the second group. It does not shy away from the assignment of dollars
for lives even when the valuations include highly subjective variables such as
lost companionship or lost hedonic value. One of the fundamentals goals of
American tort law is to translate injuries suffered by plaintiffs into monetary
values that must be paid by negligent defendants. However, the issue of whether
a lost chance for a better outcome is compensable has been controversial.

2.1. The Traditional All-or-Nothing Rule
Under traditional tort principles, monetary damages awards are provided to the
plaintiff (the injured party or representatives of the injured party) on an all or
nothing basis. If a defendant's negligent conduct ``more likely than not'' caused
an injury to a plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to a full recovery. If the injury was
death, then the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff (as represented by
family members) the full value of the victim's life.
Consider a medical malpractice case in which Suzy appears at her doctor's
of®ce with a disease that affords her a 51 percent chance to live, and a 49 percent
chance to die.1 Suppose further that Suzy's doctor treats her in a negligent
fashion and, in doing so, reduces her chance to live from 51 to 0 percent. Under
traditional tort law Suzy's estate can recover 100 percent of the value of Suzy's
life after she dies. Even though Suzy might have died from her disease if treated
properly, because her death more likely than not was caused by the negligent
behavior of her doctor, the traditional law holds the doctor fully responsible
for her death. Algebraically, if (D2 D1 )=D2 > 0:50 where D1  pre-negligence
P(death), and D2  post-negligence P(death), then traditional tort law holds
negligent party responsible for the death. This is commonly referred to as ``but
for'' causation. That is, death probably would not have occurred ``but for'' the
negligent conduct. If Suzy's chance to live was less than 50 percent prior to her
doctor's negligent actions (i.e. D1 > 50 percent), then the plaintiff would be
unable to demonstrate ``but for'' causation. Algebraically, if D1 > 50 percent, then
(D2 D1 )=D2 < 0:50 for all values of D2. Under traditional tort law, a summary
judgment in favor of the defendant must be entered in such cases.

2.2. The Loss of Chance Doctrine
The all-or-nothing traditional rule may seem arbitrary to a probabilist. Does it
really make sense to allow a full recovery for patients who lose a 51 percent
1
Evidence of pre- and post-injury probabilities of death in medical malpractice cases are usually
provided by experts via 5-year survival data for patients with comparable illnesses.
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chance to live but to deny any recovery for patients who lose a 49 percent chance
to live? Should not a 49 percent lost chance to live be treated both as an injury
and one that is practically as severe as a 51 percent lost chance?
In recent years, courts in England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium,
and about half of the states in the United States have embraced a controversial
alternative to the all-or-nothing rule in malpractice cases2 called the ``loss of
chance'' doctrine. According to this doctrine, if negligence is proven (usually by
a preponderance of the evidence), then the defendant must compensate the
plaintiff.
When the loss of chance doctrine is applied in a medical malpractice case,
injury is not de®ned as the physical harm (usually death) that may result from
the negligent acts of the defendant. Instead, the lost chance for a better outcome
is the injury. In its purest form, a loss of chance occurs regardless of whether
the physical injury is suffered.3 The idea is that patients have been injured by
the very fact that they have been forced to accept their fate in a lottery that
has worse odds than the lottery they would have faced absent the negligent acts
of their doctors. Damages are awarded because doctors deprived patients of a
chance to liveÐÐnot because the doctors caused the ailment or the death of the
patient. Accordingly, it is the value of the lost chance that must be assessed by
the fact®nder, and not merely the value of the life that was injured or lost.

2.3. Lost Chance Valuation: Proportional versus Discretionary
Having drawn the distinction between the value of a life and the value of a lost
chance to live, it is no doubt true that the former will and should in¯uence the
latter. In his classic article on lost chance valuations, Joseph King suggested that
lost chance damages should be computed by multiplying the total value of the
patient's life by the percentage lost due to negligence (King 1981). Thus, if a
patient lost a 30 percent chance to live due to a doctor's negligence, the doctor
should pay the patient 30 percent of the total value of his life. Such a proportional valuation method has several nice properties. It ensures that patients who
have less than a 50 percent chance to live receive compensation for their injuries.
It also provides a closer link between magnitude of injury and size of the damage
award than that provided by an all-or-nothing approach. Consequently, proportional valuation not only deters negligent treatment of those who have less
than a 50 percent chance to live by otherwise untouchable doctors, but it also
protects doctors from overpaying for the harm that they cause.
Whereas some loss of chance jurisdictions use a proportional approach to
valuation, others use a more ¯exible discretionary valuation approach. In such
2

In some countries, the loss of chance doctrine is employed in medical malpractice cases, whereas
in others it is employed in legal malpractice cases.
3
In practice, courts that hear loss of chance cases usually require that a physical injury has
occurred. For an exception, see Claudet v. Weyrich (1995).
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jurisdictions, valuation of the lost chance is left entirely up to the judgment of
a jury. Although some have argued that discretionary valuation ``lead[s] to more
just results because the jury has the opportunity to assess and evaluate all
factors,'' (Smith 1991: 177), some courts do not agree:
We feel that there is no real difference between either method. Whichever method is used,
the decisionmaker must make a highly subjective decision. In the [discretionary valuation]
method . . . the decisionmaker must make the subjective decision of what amount of
money would fully compensate the plaintiff for her injuries. The [proportional valuation]
approach requires the decisionmaker to make the subjective decision of allotting a
monetary amount for the value of plaintiff's life. We agree with plaintiff's counsel in the
present case that the [proportional valuation] approach basically involves a subjective
judgment being mathematically discounted. We are unconvinced that the mathematical
discounting of the subjective value of human life somehow makes that approach any
more precise and more accurate than the approach we have chosen. (Borgren v. U.S.
1989: p. 583)

2.4. An Early Case: Chaplin v. Hicks (1911)
One of the earliest applications of discretionary valuation in a loss of chance case
occurred in the English case Chaplin v. Hicks (1911). The defendant Hicks was a
theatrical manager who set up a contest for ``young ladies desirous of obtaining
engagements as actresses'' (1911: 786). The prize was a 3-year acting contract.
According to the rules, the United Kingdom would be divided into ten districts
and photographs of the aspiring actresses would be placed in various newspapers. The ®ve actresses who received the most votes from newspaper readers in
each of the districts were then promised interviews with Hicks. From among that
group of ®fty ®nalists, Hicks would choose twelve winners. Approximately 6000
women participated in the contest. The plaintiff Chaplin received the most votes
from her district, and thus became one of the ®fty ®nalists. However, Hicks
breached his contract by failing to provide Chaplin with adequate notice of her
interview. Chaplin was not interviewed hence was not among the twelve winners. The contractual breach by Hicks reduced Chaplin's chance to win from
24 percent (twelve out of ®fty) to 0 percent. At trial, a jury found in favor
Chaplin and awarded her L 100. This amount was approximately 16 percent of
the value of the average winner's contract. An appellate court af®rmed on
grounds that ``expulsion from a limited class of competitors . . . is an injury and
may be a very substantial one'' (1911: 795).
The discretionary valuation in Chaplin resulted in an award that was smaller
than what a proportionate approach would have yielded. Though interesting, it is
hard to assess the signi®cance of this outcome. The award may have been
in¯uenced by a desire to produce a round number, bad math, or jury compromise.
It might also have resulted from a shared belief that, because Ms. Chaplin was
unlikely to win the contest even if the negligence had not occurred, her lost
chance was worth less than 24 percent of the value of the contract.
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3. LOST CHANCE: A FOREGONE DISCOUNT OR
CONCRETE LOSS?

By its very name, the ``loss of chance'' calls to mind lost opportunity: A lost
opportunity to receive a more positive outcome. This idea is much like a foregone discount. Therefore, one possibility is that jurors who are asked to value
lost chances may do so much as they would other foregone discounts. A second
possibility is that jurors may regard a lost chance as an injury or concrete loss.
Under this view, the lost chance is a penalty or surcharge. Whether jurors view a
lost chance as a foregone gain or as a concrete loss may in¯uence the damage
awards they provide.
According to the value function of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979), people think about gains and losses relative to reference points rather
than in terms of absolute amounts. Losses are disliked about twice as much as the
absolute equivalent gains are liked, and the shape of the utility curve is concave
in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Figure 12.1 depicts
the prospect theory value function.
If the prospect theory value function describes injury valuations in loss of
chance cases, jurors' damage awards will not be well described by a proportional

Gains
Reference point

Y

Losses

X1

–X1

–2Y

Figure 12.1. Prospect theory value function
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valuation scheme.4 Whereas a proportional valuation treats every ®xed X percent
lost chance equivalently regardless of pre- and post-negligence chance to live,
prospect theory suggests that deviations from reference points will play a key
role. It is, therefore, important to identify which reference point jurors use.5
There are several possibilities.

3.1. Lost Chance as Foregone Discount
3.1.1. Reference Point: P(Live)  0 percent
Because loss of chance cases are usually brought to trial after the patient has
died, jurors may use a 0 percent live reference point. Under this scenario, lost
chances to live are viewed as foregone chances for better outcomes in the
concave portion of the value function (upper right quadrant). If true, then for a
®xed (A B) percent lost chance, where A  pre-negligence chance to live, and
B  post-negligence chance to live, the injury will appear more damaging when
it occurs to sicker people (i.e. low A values) and higher awards will be assigned
in these cases.6 Thus, a 20 percent lost chance will be viewed as worse (hence
deserving of a higher damage award) when the victim's pre-negligence chance
to live was 20 percent rather than, say, 100 percent. This is because the concave
utility curve for gains shows a greater difference between the utilities of a
0 percent chance to live and a 20 percent chance to live than between the utilities
of 80 and 100 percent.
3.2. Lost Chance as Concrete Loss
If lost chances are viewed as concrete losses, then the convex portion of the
prospect theory value function (lower left quadrant) applies. It provides a very
different set of predictions about how jurors will treat a ®xed (A B) percent lost
chance. Under this scenario, either of two reference points seems reasonable.

3.2.1. Reference Point: P(Live)  P(Live, pre-negligence)
One possible reference point is the patient's pre-negligence chance to live. Under
this scenario, a lost chance will be viewed as a movement from a neutral reference point onto the steepest part of the loss function. All ®xed (A B) percent
4

At ®rst blush, one might presume that the prospect theory decision weight function provides a
better model for understanding how people think about lost chances than the prospect theory value
function. The weighting function describes how people weight or ``distort'' (Gonzalez and Wu 1999)
probabilities, whereas the value function concerns the values that people assign to different prospects.
In the tort law context, prospects typically include physical injuries such as a broken leg or death. But,
as noted previously, the injury in loss of chance cases is the lost chance itself rather than the physical
harm that may result from a defendant's negligent actions. In these cases, the lost chance is the
prospect to which jurors attach value. Consequently, I look to the value function to provide insight on
valuations of lost chances.
5
Prospect theory does not provide a clear account of reference point formation. It only supplies a
model for the evaluation of options conditioned on the use of certain reference points.
6
For simplicity, uncertainty regarding proof of negligence is ignored throughout.
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lost chances will have identical disutilities. This implies that jurors will assign
identical damage awards for ®xed (A B) percent lost chances, regardless of
whether the negligence is in¯icted on a relatively healthy or sick patient. Thus,
a 20 percent lost chance will lead to the same jury award whether the victim's
pre-negligence chance to live was 20, 100 percent, or any other value. This
insensitivity to starting point is a property shared by the proportional valuation
model. However, given that lost chances in the present discretionary valuation
model take place on the steepest part of the loss curve (i.e. just to the left of the
reference point), the model also implies that jurors will provide damage awards
that are systematically larger than those assigned by proportional valuation.

3.2.2. Reference Point: P(Live)  100 percent
Another possible reference point is a 100 percent chance to live. This reference
point may exist if jurors fail to adjust for the preexisting injury suffered by
patients prior to the negligent conduct of their doctors. As in the P(Live) 
P(Live, pre-negligence) scenario, the P(Live)  100 percent scenario implies that
lost chances take place in the domain of losses, and that injuries that occur to
healthy people (e.g. 100 percent chance to live, pre-negligence) will take place
on the steepest part of the loss curve (which, in turn, produces relatively large
damage awards). However, unlike the P(Live)  P(Live, pre-negligence) scenario,
the P(Live)  100 percent scenario implies that lost chances will not seem as bad
when they occur to relatively unhealthy patients relative to healthy patients.
Thus, a 20 percent lost chance will receive a smaller damage award when the
victim's pre-negligence chance to live was only 20 percent to begin with as
opposed to, say, 100 percent. This is because the convex utility curve for losses at
this reference point (100 percent chance to live) shows a smaller difference
between the utilities of a 20 percent chance to live and a 0 percent chance to live
than between the utilities of 100 and 80 percent. Figure 12.2 depicts the shape of

Reference point:
P(Live) = 100%
Award ($)

100–80 80–60 60–40 40–20 20–0
Lost chance to live (20% increments)

Figure 12.2. Theoretical award curve for lost chances
Note: Reference point  100% chance to live.
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the theoretical damage award curve that corresponds to a P(Live)  100 percent
reference point.
4. LOST CHANCE: CERTAINTY AND FRAMING EFFECTS
Thus far, I have suggested that jurors' damage award judgments in loss of chance
cases may depend, in part, on which X percent chance was lost. Depending on
the reference point jurors adopt, a person who loses their last 20 percent chance
to live may be compensated differently than one who loses their ®rst 20 percent
chance.

4.1. Certainty
A related possibility is that award judgments may depend on whether jurors
believe that the injury caused a change in the patient's chance to live from
certain to uncertain or vice versa. A patient who was certain to live prenegligence has incurred a life status change from certainty to uncertainty. Where
there once was no risk, now risk appears. Conversely, a patient whose postnegligence chance to live is 0 percent has incurred a life status change from
uncertainty to certainty. Where the patient once had a chance to live, he or she
now has no chance at all. However, a patient who faced some chance to die
pre-negligence and retains some chance to live post-negligence has not experienced a change of status from certain to uncertain or vice versa. Will jurors ®nd
that negligent acts that move patients between risk and certainty are more
harmful?
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) identi®ed
the presence of ``certainty effects'' in judgment. Recently, Loewenstein et al.
(2001) offered a general framework for understanding how people feel about risk
and certainty. They note that there is something about changes from the perception of certain safety to the perception of possible harm that arouses our
emotions. Likewise, we feel relief when risks are eliminated completely, no
matter how small the risks were initially. For example, psychophysical studies
indicate that the mere possibility of harmÐÐas opposed to the precise probability
that the harm will occurÐÐimpacts arousal levels. If true, then there may be an
arousal response in loss of chance cases such that jurors respond with higher
awards in response to injuries that move a patient away from and/or toward
certainty and uncertainty.

4.2. Framing Effects: Lost Chance to Live versus Increased
Chance to Die
The framing literature is replete with studies that show foregone gains can be
translated into sustained losses (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998). Sometimes
this is accomplished by altering the perceived reference point from which
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an outcome is evaluated. For example, a food product that is described as
containing 25 percent fat may appear unhealthy because 25 percent fat is
implicitly compared to a 0 percent fat reference point. However, when the same
product is described as 75 percent lean, it may appear more healthy because the
implicit reference point is 0 percent lean (see Levin and Gaeth 1988). This ®nding
has special relevance to loss of chance cases because a 20 percent loss of chance
to live could also be presented to jurors as a 20 percent increased chance to die.
Unlike the loss of chance frame, the increased chance to die frame unambiguously places the decision-maker in the domain of losses. Thus, although the two
frames describe identical outcomes, jurors who learn of an ``increased chance
to die'' may ®nd the injury to be more severe (and thus deserving of a higher
damage award) than jurors who learn of a ``loss of chance.''
5. RESULTS OF STUDIES WITH MOCK JURORS
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To test these ideas, Koehler (2002: experiment 1) presented several hundred
mock jurors with a written breast cancer medical malpractice case. The jurors
were asked to identify how much money, if any, they would award the plaintiff.
In this case, there was uncontroversial evidence that the patient lost a 20 percent
chance to live and that the value of her life was $10,000,000. The patient's prenegligence chance to live was identi®ed as either 100, 80, 60, 40, or 20 percent.
The results were most consistent with a prospect theory loss function in which
jurors evaluate lost chances relative against a reference point of a 100 percent
chance to live (or, equivalently, a 0 percent chance to die). However, even this
model was not perfectly predictive of damage awards. Jurors assigned much
higher awards for cases involving a perfectly healthy patient (i.e. P(Live,
pre-negligence  100 percent)) than for cases involving sick patients (i.e. P(Live,
pre-negligence <100 percent)). Among the sick patients, awards did not vary as
a function of degree of illness. The certainty effect predictions were only partially supported. Whereas relatively high awards were given for patients whose
chance to live was reduced to 80 percent from 100 percent, there was no
comparable boost in awards for patients whose chance to live was reduced from
20 to 0 percent. In stark contrast to the predictions of a proportional valuation
model, median awards were signi®cantly larger than $2,000,000 regardless of
pre-negligence chance to live.
Koehler (2002) also reported an effect for frame, though the effect apparently
did not involve a reference point shift. Jurors awarded more money at each of
®ve pre-negligence probability levels when the doctor's negligent acts were
framed as increasing the patient's risk of death rather than as decreasing the
patient's chance to live. However, the pattern of results between the two frames
was otherwise similar. That is, in both frames, higher awards were given to
patients whose pre-negligence chance to survive was 100 percent.
In a follow-up study using (a) different versions of a videotaped hypothetical
colon cancer trial, and (b) deliberation by seventy-®ve juries (n  5 to 6 people
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per jury), Koehler (2002: experiment 2) essentially replicated the frame effect.
Jurors who learned about a 10 percent increased risk of death gave higher
ratings to the strength of the plaintiff's case and assigned higher damage awards
than jurors who learned about a 10 percent loss of chance to live. These followup results are signi®cant because they indicate that the framing effect can appear
even in the context of a rich, complex trial environment.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
I noted at the outset that behaviors that violate normative theory sometimes
challenge the prescriptive status of that theory. However, the law has a long
history of neglecting the results of behavioral studies (Saks and Baron 1980). Not
only do high court judges frequently favor untutored behavioral intuitions over
scienti®c data (see, for example, Saks 1974), but no Supreme Court majority
opinion from 1970 to 1988 ``relied even partly on the psychology of jury behavior
to justify a decision about the proper way to conduct a trial'' (Tanford 1990: 139).
Against this backdrop, it is unclear how the legal establishment will respond to
empirical data that show how people value losses of chance. If the views of one
law professor are any indication, these data may need to be bolstered with legal
arguments before they impact the rule of law. Fischer (2001) accepts the ®nding
that people value lost chances differently depending on where the loss falls on
the probability to live spectrum. But he contends that this descriptive result
re¯ects little more than erroneous human judgment: ``[A] 10 percent chance of
losing $100,000 in support is $10,000 regardless of whether the reduction is
from 10 percent to 0 percent or from 40 percent to 30%'' (p. 620). In response,
I note that the question of interestÐÐ``How much is a 10 percent chance of losing
$100,000 worth?''ÐÐis not identical to the mathematical question ``What is 10%
of $100,000?'' Loss of chance jurisdictions that rely on discretionary valuations
rather than proportional valuations do so out of an implicit recognition that
jurors should use some judgmentÐÐrather than a mathematical ruleÐÐwhen
deciding how much money to award. Indeed, it would defeat the purpose of a
discretionary valuation rule if it required that lost chance awards be identical to
the expected value of lost wages or any other tangible loss.7
Although courts in discretionary valuation loss of chance jurisdictions allow
jurors to value awards as they see ®t, only one court has expressly suggested that
jurors may wish to consider where the lost chance falls on the probability
spectrum. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff may wish to
argue that ``a ten percent chance of survival may be more signi®cant when
reduced from ten percent to zero than when reduced from forty to thirty
percent,'' (Smith v. State Dept. of Health and Hosps. 1996: 549).
7
Fischer (2001) notes that where the loss falls on the probability spectrum may properly in¯uence
mental distress damages.
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Interestingly, the empirical results summarized here and detailed in Koehler
(2002) suggest that the court's intuition may be ¯awed. Jurors probably do not
value the loss of a ®nal X percent chance to live more than other losses. In fact,
the available data suggest that current loss of chance law may not be at odds
with the psychology of judgment.
First, consider the ®nding that mock jurors reserve their highest awards for
lost chances suffered by those who were not previously at risk (i.e. 100 percent
chance to live). In most loss of chance states, a perfectly healthy person who
suffers an injury is not entitled to participate in a loss of chance claim. A lost
chance claim ordinarily requires a preexisting injury. For claims made by those
who were perfectly healthy prior to the negligent actions, the all or nothing
doctrine is applicable. Thus, a judgment for the plaintiff results in an award for
100 percent of the value of the patient's life regardless of the amount of chance
that was lost. This outcome is fairly consistent with the awards provided by mock
jurors in Koehler (2002) which averaged 85 percent of the value of the victim's
life when a perfectly healthy patients lost a 20 percent chance to live.
Second, with the exception of perfectly healthy patients, mock jurors in
Koehler (2002) gave similar awards for a 20 percent lost chance, regardless of
which 20 percent on the probability spectrum was lost. This result is consistent
with current practice in the many proportional valuation jurisdictions. However,
the awards mock jurors provided were signi®cantly larger than proportional
valuations. Though the ecological validity of this study remains to be examined,
the data suggest that discretionary valuation jurisdictions may have higher
awards than proportional valuation jurisdictions.
Finally, a word about the strategic use of the data. First, the ®nding that mock
jurors assigned high discretionary valuations may in¯uence decisions about
(a) whether to proceed to trial, and (b) what constitutes a reasonable settlement
offer. The data suggest that defendants in discretionary valuation jurisdictions
who are likely to be found negligent may wish to make a proportional settlement
offer rather than take their chances with the jury. Second, empirical evidence
from two studies that mock jurors gave larger awards for injuries that were
presented as increased chances to die rather than as decreased chances to live has
strategic value. There seems to be something worse about a doctor who increases
a patient's chance to die relative to one who decreases a patient's chance to live.
If true, then plaintiffs should use increased risk language whereas defendants
should use lost chance language. What effect, if any, the combined use of these
phrases has on fact®nders awaits future research.
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